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The current debate on corporate governance theories has been polarized between a shareholder 
perspective and a stakeholder perspective (Letza et al., 2004; Szwajkowski, 2000; Vinten, 2001). 
These two contrasting paradigms have different ways of understanding and justifying 
fundamental questions concerning the purpose of the corporation and its associated structure of 
governance and arrangements. On one side is the traditional shareholding model that regards the 
corporation as a legal instrument for shareholders to maximize their own interests, i.e. investment 
returns. On the other side is the relatively new stakeholding approach that views the corporation 
as a locus of responsibility related to wider external stakeholders’ interests rather than merely to 
shareholders’ wealth. Employees, creditors, suppliers, customers and the local community are 
major stakeholders often mentioned and emphasized within a broad definition of stakeholders. 
Beyond this theoretical debate, it can be observed that current measures of good governance 
practices are for the most part consistent with agency theory, the dominant approach 
underpinning the shareholder perspective (Wheeler and Davies, 2004). Typically, these measures 
analyze the duties of the board and their agents (i.e. the CEO and senior management), their 
mutual independence, the oversight of compensation and other incentives and mechanisms for 
assuring accountability for shareholders’ wealth (e.g. market for corporate control). However, the 
empirical evidence on the impact of these board structures and processes is inconclusive. For 
instance, Dalton et al. (1998) conducted a meta-analysis of data from 85 studies and found no 
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evidence of any consistent, systematic relationship between governance structure and financial 
performance, irrespective of the type of performance indicator, the size of the firm or the manner 
in which board composition is measured. 
Recent corporate governance codes emphasize stakeholder governance practices, often in 
connection with social and environmental responsibility (Wieland, 2005). However, despite the 
growing attention given to these issues (e.g. Alkhafaji, 1998; Clarke, 1998), there has been little 
research on how to integrate the interests of all the different stakeholders into the corporation’s 
decision-making and management processes and on the effects of adherence to these practices. 
Although scholars of corporate governance have distinguished a Continental-European/Japanese 
stakeholder system from an Anglo-American shareholder system, these highly stylized portraits 
are primarily used to explain differences between countries in finance, ownership, labor relations 
and the role of the market in corporate control, as well as to explore the possibilities of 
convergence or continued divergence in corporate governance practices (Aguilera and Jackson, 
2003). Less attention has been paid to concrete mechanisms for involving a wide array of 
stakeholders in company governance and for using these mechanisms as a way of addressing the 
needs of diverse stakeholders within a strategy of corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
Thus, the purpose of the present paper is threefold. First, it tries to advance in the firm-level 
characterization of the emerging stakeholder approach to corporate governance by proposing 
three dimensions for this kind of corporate governance model: CSR function at board level, board 
diversity and stakeholder engagement. Second, it intends to examine the relationship between 
conformance to the stakeholder model of corporate governance and firm financial performance. 
Third, it explores differences between countries by using an international sample of large 
companies. Even though we acknowledge that the stakeholder orientation to corporate 
governance considers a set of objectives that go beyond financial and market performance (such 
as more qualitative relational aspects of performance involving trust and commitment), here we 
will focus exclusively on financial measures as a quantitative indicator for this wider 
organizational performance. 
This paper is structured as follows: in the next section we review the relevant literature on the 
stakeholder approach to corporate governance and develop the hypotheses that we are going to 
test; following this, we present the data and the results of the empirical analysis; finally, we 
discuss the contributions and limitations of the paper and finish with some conclusions. 
Literature review and hypotheses development 
The stakeholder approach to corporate governance 
Stakeholder theory can be traced back to the seminal work of Freeman (1984), who articulated a new 
conceptual model wherein firms must address the interests of their stakeholders – groups and 
individuals who can affect or are affected by the organization’s activities. This ‘stakeholder model’ 
proposes extending the focus of managers beyond the traditional interest group of shareholders in 
order to understand the needs, expectations and values of groups previously perceived to be external 
to the company. In this sense, stakeholders of a firm can be defined as “individuals and constituencies 
that contribute, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to its wealth-creating capacity and activities, and 
who are therefore its potential beneficiaries and/or risk bearers” (Post et al., 2002, p. 58). Stakeholder  
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theory has both normative (moral/ethical) and instrumental (profit/wealth-enhancing) implications, 
since dealing with stakeholders can be regarded as a responsibility to meet the legitimate claims of all 
stakeholders and/or as a means to maximize organizational wealth (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; 
Jones, 1995; Jones and Wicks, 1999). 
In corporate governance, the normative stakeholder theory has its origins in the social entity 
conception of the corporation, developed in the later part of the 19
th century (Letza et al., 2004). 
This theory regards the corporation as a public association constituted through political and legal 
processes and as a social entity for pursuing collective goals with public obligations (see e.g., 
Gamble and Kelly, 2001, p. 115). With the fundamental value of human rights and morality as a 
reference framework, it is argued that “the standard of a corporation’s usefulness is not whether it 
creates individual wealth but whether it helps society gain a greater sense of the meaning of 
community by honoring individual dignity and promoting overall welfare” (Sullivan and Conlon, 
1997, p. 713). This view of the corporation as an entity that serves corporate and social interests has 
been acknowledged by the normative or moral standpoint of stakeholder theory (e.g., Carroll, 1996). 
Instrumental stakeholder theory is often connected with the pluralistic model of corporate 
governance (Letza et al., 2004). Like social entity theory, the pluralistic model claims that a 
corporation should serve multiple interests of stakeholders rather than shareholder interests alone. 
However, it legitimizes stakeholder value not on the basis of its intrinsic worth but as an effective 
means to improve efficiency, profitability, competitiveness and economic success. In that sense it 
argues that stakeholders who make firm-specific investments and contributions and bear risks in 
the corporation should participate in corporate decision-making as a way of enhancing corporate 
efficiency (e.g., Blair, 1995; Kelly and Parkinson, 1998). Thus, stakeholding is not regarded as an 
end in itself but as an effective means of achieving specific goals, as posited by instrumental 
stakeholder theory (e.g. Stoney and Wistansley, 2001). 
Stakeholder theory is also connected with the literature of corporate sustainability and CSR, since 
it provides a suitable theoretical framework for analyzing the relationship between business and 
society (Clarkson, 1995; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Waddock and Graves, 1997a). As Clarkson 
(1995) argues, making corporate social responsibility a business objective is best undertaken by 
changing intangible social and environmental issues into tangible stakeholder interests. Thus, the 
stakeholder approach to corporate governance fits perfectly within the view of the firm that 
strives to deliver sustainable value to its various stakeholders (Wheeler and Davies, 2004). 
However, as noted by Ricart et al. (2005), little attention has yet been paid to the implications of 
corporate sustainability on corporate governance. Neither does there exist any consensus in the 
literature about which corporate governance variables best represent the stakeholder model. In the 
following section we will argue for the relevance of three dimensions when analyzing a pro-
stakeholder stance to corporate governance: CSR function at board level, board diversity and 
stakeholder engagement. 
CSR function at board level 
One key issue in the literature on corporate governance is the structure of the board of directors. 
Board structure refers to the dimensions of the board’s organization, covering the number and types 
of committees, committee membership, and the flow of information among these committees (Zahra 
and Pearce, 1989). Researchers on agency theory have recommended the creation of compensation 
and appointment committees, audit committees and shareholder relations committees that would 
protect shareholders’ rights (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). There is  
4 - IESE Business School-University of Navarra 
evidence that setting up these kinds of entities permits directors to deal more specifically with 
relevant issues affecting the corporation. For instance, Wallace and Cravens (1993) showed that 
large US public companies with a nomination committee displayed both a market advantage and an 
accounting-quantified performance advantage over companies without. According to Ricart et al. 
(2005), adapting board structure to sustainability issues is a fundamental factor in ensuring better 
quality and depth of overall formulation and implementation of corporate sustainability strategy – 
including the relationships with various stakeholders. 
So far, empirical research on the intersection of corporate governance and stakeholder theory has 
focused either on the perceptions of board members regarding their stakeholders or CSR orientation 
(Agle et al., 1999; Ibrahim and Angelidis, 1995; Wang and Dewhirst, 1992) or on the representation 
of stakeholders on the board of directors (Hillman et al., 2001; Luoma and Goodstein, 1999). Some 
studies have also examined the effects of board composition on a firm’s stakeholder performance 
(Hillman et al., 2001) and corporate social performance (Johnson and Greening, 1999). However, to 
our knowledge no one has studied the impact of dealing with CSR or sustainable development 
issues in the boardroom. The integration of CSR issues into board structure will likely lead to a 
broader governance perspective that takes into account the interests of multiple stakeholders. Thus, 
considering the evidence found for other board committees, such as audit, compensation and 
nomination committees, it seems reasonable to propose the existence of CSR function at board level 
as a reliable indicator for a stakeholder approach to corporate governance and also, following the 
arguments of instrumental stakeholder theory, as a means to maximize organizational wealth. Thus, 
we propose the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: Explicit CSR function at board level will be positively associated with firm-
level indicators of a stakeholder approach to corporate governance (board diversity and 
stakeholder engagement). 
Hypothesis 1b: Explicit CSR function at board level will have a positive effect on firm 
financial performance. 
Board diversity 
The link between diversity and corporate governance is a relatively new one (Fields and Keys, 
2003). Within corporate governance, the concept of diversity relates to board composition and the 
varied combination of attributes, characteristics and expertise contributed by individual board 
members in relation to board process and decision-making. On corporate boards, the various 
types of diversity that may be represented among directors include age, gender, ethnicity, culture, 
religion, constituency representation, professional background, knowledge, technical skills and 
expertise, commercial and industry experience, and career and life experience (Milliken and 
Martins, 1996, cited in Van der Walt and Ingley, 2003, p. 219). 
Present research has not been framed within a specific theoretical perspective and has built on 
different arguments in favor of greater boardroom diversity. On the one hand, moral justifications 
are mentioned, like the obligation to represent all stakeholder interests in an equitable way, 
especially formerly underrepresented groups like women and ethnic minorities. On the other, several 
arguments are made for the business case for board diversity, such as better understanding of the 
marketplace, increasing creativity and innovation, more effective problem-solving, more effective 
corporate leadership and more effective global relationships (Carter et al., 2003). Some of these 
conceptual reasons for promoting board diversity can be supported by resource dependence theory,  
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since a more diverse board appears to increase the resources brought in by individual board 
members and the organization’s access to external resources (Van der Walt and Ingley, 2003). 
Consequently, most researchers assume a positive relationship between board diversity and 
organizational performance. 
Although board diversity has not been connected to stakeholder theory in the literature, the 
rationale used parallel arguments of normative and instrumental stakeholder theory: corporations 
have a responsibility to reflect societal diversity in their governance boards, but at the same time 
this will allow them to establish improved relationships with increasingly diverse stakeholders. 
Greater demographic diversity on boards will place the firm in a better position to establish links 
with different stakeholder groups (employees, suppliers, customers). In addition, diversity 
management has become an important indicator for CSR and corporate citizenship and is used in 
corporate social ratings systems such as the KLD Indexes or the FTSE4Good Index. Thus, we 
propose interpreting board diversity as an indicator for the stakeholder approach to corporate 
governance. 
Most of the empirical studies conducted focus on gender and ethnic diversity. Table 1 provides a 
summary of the studies that examine the presence of women and ethnic minorities on corporate 
boards and its impact on firm performance or shareholder wealth. All studies are based on samples 
of large US firms and use secondary data for calculating percentages of women or minorities (i.e. 
African, Hispanic, Asian and Native Americans) on the board of directors. Whereas Erhardt et al. 
(2003) and Carter et al. (2003) found significant positive relationships between board diversity and 
financial performance, the other studies found negative or statistically insignificant relationships. 
The research of Shrader et al. (1997) has the limitation that it only controls for firm size indirectly 
and takes no other control variables into consideration, while the research of Zahra and Stanton 
(1988) has the problem of limited female representation on the boards that were studied (typically 
one woman per board). Another stream of research has tested the relationship between the 
proportion of women and minority directors and corporate philanthropy (Coffey and Wang, 1998; 
Wang and Coffey, 1992; Williams, 2003) and corporate social performance (Siciliano, 1996; 
Stanwick and Stanwick, 1998), obtaining mostly positive relationships. 
Table 1 
Empirical studies on the relationship between board diversity and financial performance 
Study Data  Findings 
Erhardt et al. 
(2003) 
112 large US companies from 
different production and service 
sectors 
Ethnic and gender representation on boards 
increases firm financial performance (ROA, 
ROI  
Carter et al. (2003)  638 US Fortune 1000 firms 
pertaining to 8 one-digit SIC code 
industries 
Presence of women or minorities on 
corporate boards positively affects firm value 
(Tobin’s Q) 
Shrader et al. 
(1997) 
200 US firms with the largest 
market value 
Presence of women on the board is 
negatively related to firm financial 
performance (ROS, ROA, ROI, ROE) 
Zahra and Stanton 
(1988) 
100 US Fortune 500 firms from 
different sectors 
Female and ethnic minority representation on 
boards is not associated with firm financial 
performance (ROE, profit margin on sales, 
net sales-to-equity, EPS, DPS, Log profits)  
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To sum up, the existing literature suggests that there are conceptual reasons to associate greater 
board diversity with increased financial performance, with some empirical evidence to prove this 
relationship. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Board diversity will have a positive effect on firm financial performance. 
Stakeholder engagement 
According to stakeholder theory, firms have to consider the interests of multiple stakeholders in 
managerial decision-making. Following this argument, Hill and Jones (1992) developed a 
‘stakeholder-agency theory’ and argued that managers should act as ‘agents’ for stakeholders (the 
relevant ‘principals’). In order to obtain accurate information concerning the expectations of 
stakeholders, companies have to develop strategies for engaging with stakeholders and for 
understanding their needs and concerns. Since the goals, priorities and demands of different 
stakeholder groups are different and often contradictory, scholars usually classify stakeholders into 
primary and secondary types (Clarkson, 1995; Post et al., 2002; Waddock et al., 2002). The primary 
or core stakeholder group refers to stakeholders that are essential for the business itself to exist 
and/or have some kind of formal contract with the business (owners/shareholders, employees, 
customers and suppliers). The secondary stakeholder group includes social and political stakeholders 
that play a fundamental role in obtaining business credibility and acceptance of its activities 
(NGOs/activists, communities, governments and competitors). Furthermore, Driscoll and Starik 
(2004) broaden the stakeholder definition to include the natural environment, and Hart and 
Sharma (2004) add the existence of peripheral stakeholders or “fringe” stakeholders as those parties 
not visible or readily identifiable to the firm.  
An active engagement with stakeholders can thus be considered both a condition for and a 
consequence of the stakeholder approach to corporate governance. Stakeholder engagement 
processes range from identification of key stakeholders to long-term project teams and 
partnerships. While it is not the role of the board to be involved in the implementation of tactical 
programs of stakeholder management, it must ensure that the company is aware of stakeholder 
needs and takes them into account in board decisions and corporate strategy (for normative 
and/or instrumental reasons). In this sense, Ricart et al. (2005) report that leading companies in 
corporate sustainability are using stakeholder engagement mechanisms to a greater extent than 
other companies. 
But despite the important theoretical debate about stakeholder engagement, there has been little 
empirical research on the benefits of stakeholder relationships for firms. Although several 
researchers have suggested that the satisfaction of multiple stakeholder needs contributes to firm 
value creation (Clarkson, 1995; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Jones, 1995), few studies have 
attempted to quantify organizational attitudes and behavior towards stakeholders. Within the field 
of marketing, Greenley and Foxall (1997) and Chung-Leung Luk et al. (2005) analyzed perceptual 
measures of companies’ attentiveness to competitors, customers, employees, shareholders and 
unions and reported positive effects on business performance. Empirical research framed within the 
corporate social performance context has used active firm-stakeholder relationships as a predictor 
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Table 2 
Empirical studies on the relationship between stakeholder management and financial performance 
Study Data  Findings 
Hillman and Keim 
(2001) 
308 US Fortune 1000/Standard & 
Poor’s 500 firms pertaining to 
different two-digit SIC code 
industries 
Stakeholder management is positively 
associated with shareholder value creation 




10 water supply companies of the 
UK 
Performance on customer service measures 
negatively affects current profits (net income) 
but significantly enhances shareholders 
returns 
Berman et al. 
(1999) 
81 US Fortune 500 firms pertaining 
to different four-digit SIC code 
industries 
Relationships with employees and customers 
(product safety/quality issues) positively 
affect financial performance (ROA) 
Waddock and 
Graves (1997b) 
469 US Standard & Poor’s 500 
firms pertaining to 13 four-digit SIC 
code industries 
Improved corporate social responsibility 
(which includes stakeholder relations with 
employees, customers, communities and 
environment) leads to better financial 
performance (ROA, ROE, ROS) 
 
Most of these studies use the Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini and Company (KLD) database (Berman et al., 
1999; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Waddock and Graves, 1997b). KLD is a social equity fund consultancy 
that rates companies on different areas of social performance and particularly on five variables that 
have been used as measures of stakeholder management: community relations, employee relations, 
diversity issues, product issues and environment issues. In their study, Ogden and Watson (1999) use 
specific customer-service performance measures developed for UK water companies, this being the 
only study not based on samples of large US firms. They all found evidence that well-nurtured 
relationships with primary stakeholders (mostly customers and employees) have a positive effect on 
companies’ financial performance. Since it appears that relationships with primary stakeholders 
improve financial performance, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3a: Engagement with primary stakeholders (customers and employees) will have 
a positive effect on firm financial performance. 
Only Hillman and Keim (2001) report a positive effect on firm performance of relationships with 
secondary stakeholders such as the local community. However, many scholars advocate the 
importance of engaging with external, non-economic stakeholders (Hart and Sharma, 2004; 
Sharma and Vredenburg, 1998) in order to build meaningful and sincere relationships which can 
become the source of competitive advantage. Therefore, we also propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3b: Engagement with secondary stakeholders (local communities, NGOs, the 
government, etc.) will have a positive effect on firm financial performance. 
Research method 
Sample and data description 
The sample was drawn from the companies assessed within the 2004 annual review for the Dow 
Jones Sustainability Indexes (DJSI) by SAM Group. SAM Group is an independent asset  
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management group that since 1999 has annually assessed economic, environmental and social 
performance of the Dow Jones Global Index (DJGI) universe. After inviting the 2,500 largest 
capitalized companies in the world to take part in the assessment, the top 10% of companies with 
the best sustainability performance in each of the 60 industry groups are selected for inclusion in 
the DJSI World. The SAM Group assessment consists of more than 50 general and industry-specific 
criteria and one of its primary sources of information is a specific questionnaire distributed to the 
companies participating in the annual review. Further sources include company and third-party 
documents as well as personal contacts between the analysts and companies. As a result of the 
assessment, a company’s total corporate sustainability score is calculated based on a pre-defined 
scoring and weighting structure of all criteria, measured with a scale ranging between 0 and 100. 
Reliability and validity of the data are ensured via external review by PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
which monitors the accuracy of the assessment procedures and results. SAM Group’s database has 
several advantages over the previously-used data provided by social rating organizations, such as 
KLD. First, a large sample of companies from various countries is included in the database. Second, 
the assessment undertaken covers a wide range of criteria and thus allows a more fine-grained 
analysis. Third, the data are primarily based on company responses to a questionnaire which is 
designed to ensure objectivity by limiting qualitative answers through predefined multiple-choice 
questions.
1 In addition, SAM analysts use company documentation, publicly available information 
and personal contacts to verify and cross-check the data of the completed questionnaires. 
For the 2004 DJSI annual review 983 companies were analyzed. We decided to delete companies 
which were assessed after closing for the DJSI or which were acquired during the period 
considered. Our sample eventually resulted in 946 firms from 31 countries and operating in 
18 different market sectors, according to DJGI classification. The data for financial performance 
and control variables for each firm were obtained from Datastream. 
Measures 
Variables for stakeholder relations 
Our variables for stakeholder relations were constructed out of the responses to SAM Group’s 
Corporate Sustainability Assessment questionnaire. From a question about board responsibilities 
and committees we identified the companies that have assumed formal responsibility or have 
created specific committees for dealing with issues of corporate social responsibility, corporate 
citizenship or sustainable development. With regard to board diversity, the questionnaire includes 
one question about the percentage made up by the main nationality represented on the board of 
directors and another about the percentage of women on the board of directors. Thus, we measured 
board diversity using the variables of nationality and gender. As an indicator of customer 
engagement, we used a question about how the company integrates customer feedback, and as an 
indicator for employee engagement we calculated the average score of four items: lay-offs and 
worker displacement policies, company systems for collecting and handling employee grievances 
and complaints, company-specific job training, and selection rigor in company recruiting systems. 
Concerning engagement with stakeholders external to the firm, the questionnaire has one question 
                                              
1 The entire general section of the SAM questionnaire can be downloaded from the website of the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Indexes (http://www.sustainability-indexes.com).  
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addressing the number of stakeholders the company regularly addresses through satisfaction 
surveys or perception studies and one question about the mechanisms used by the company for 
engaging with these stakeholders. Therefore, we used these two variables of engagement scope and 
process. As mentioned above, all scores range from 0, indicating a bad performance, to 100, 
indicating the best relative performance, with the exception of the variables for CSR function at 
board level which have been transformed into dichotomous variables. 
Variables for financial measures 
As a measure of firm financial performance we used return on equity (ROE) for 2004, which we 
obtained directly from Datastream. We chose this accounting measure because it is among the 
most commonly used to indicate company earnings and returns to shareholders, and it conveys a 
basic sense of the overall profitability of the firms. We removed important outliers, that is, 
companies that had ROE values greater than 100 or less than -100. This process left a final data 
set of 936 companies. 
Control variables 
We included in our study several industry-, country- and firm-specific control variables. Prior 
research has suggested that firm size and industry may influence board diversity and stakeholder 
management (Carter et al., 2003; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Hillman et al., 2001; Waddock and 
Graves, 1997a). We measured firm size by the number of employees and created industry dummy 
variables for the 18 market sectors to which a company is assigned by SAM Group based on its 
primary revenue source.
2 Some studies on stakeholder management also indicated a need to 
control for firm risk (Hillman and Keim, 2001; Waddock and Graves, 1997a), thus we accounted 
for beta as a proxy for measuring the risk level of the firm. Unlike previous research, the present 
study uses a sample of companies from different countries. As this fact may have an influence on 
stakeholder management, we created country dummy variables for the 31 countries where the 
companies are based.
3  
Since Luoma and Goodstein (1999) found that legal environment influences the adoption of 
stakeholder-centered board committees, we also wanted to consider the different legal traditions 
of the countries regarding corporate governance. One of the most influential classifications of 
countries according to their corporate governance system is the one developed by La Porta et al. 
(1998). They distinguish between the Anglo-Saxon, French, German and Scandinavian legal 
traditions. Together, these four categories account for almost every capitalist country in the world 
(Guillen, 2000). In the literature it has been argued that countries with an Anglo-Saxon legal 
tradition have favored a shareholder-centered model of corporate governance, whereas countries 
with a German law tradition are defined in general as following a stakeholder-centered model of 
governance (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Hall and Soskice, 2001). The remaining countries, 
Scandinavian countries and countries within a French law tradition, are somehow more difficult 
                                              
2 Market sectors are Automobiles, Banks, Basic Resources, Chemicals, Construction, Cyclical Goods & Services, Energy, Financial 
Services, Food & Beverage, Healthcare, Industrial Goods & Services, Insurance, Media, Non-cyclical Goods & Services, 
Retail, Technology, Telecommunications, and Utilities. 
3 Countries are Brazil, Canada, Chile, Mexico, United Status, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, 
Australia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.  
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to classify purely as stakeholder or shareholders economies although most authors would define 
them as non-shareholder oriented economies, embracing most of the elements of the stakeholder 
model. The complete list of countries covered in the study is shown in Table 3.  
Table 3 




N French   
legal tradition 
N German   
legal tradition 
N Scandinavian   
legal tradition 
N 
Canada 35  Brazil 9  Austria 4  Denmark 7 
USA 325  Chile 2  Germany 39  Finland 10 
Ireland 2  Mexico 3  Switzerland 26  Norway 7 
South Africa  9  Belgium 6  Japan 126  Sweden 21 
United Kingdom  101  France 39  South Korea  6     
Australia 64  Greece 5  Taiwan 4     
Hong Kong  13  Italy 23         
Malaysia 3  Netherlands 17         
Singapore 4  Portugal 6         
Thailand 1  Spain 18         
    Indonesia 1         
Analysis and results 
We use both comparisons of means and regression analysis to test the hypothesized relationships 
between CSR function at board level, board diversity, stakeholder engagement and firm financial 
performance. Table 4 provides the means, standard deviations and correlation coefficients for all 
variables used in the analysis. Average firm size was 38,846 employees, average firm risk was 
around 1 and average ROE was 15.39%. 46% of the firms in the sample have explicitly assumed 
board responsibility for CSR issues, whereas only 21% of the firms have created specific CSR board 
committees. Although the scores for the different variables assessed by SAM cannot really be 
compared with each other, it appears that firms obtain higher scores in stakeholder engagement 
issues than in board diversity aspects.  
The two variables of CSR function at board level are positively associated with most of the 
variables of board diversity and stakeholder engagement, though the correlation is stronger with 
formal CSR board responsibility than with formal CSR committees. While the two variables of 
board diversity are not correlated at all, the four stakeholder engagement variables are positively 
correlated with each other. It is noteworthy that board diversity regarding nationalities is 
positively correlated only with external engagement variables, while board diversity regarding 
gender is marginally but negatively correlated with customer and employee variables. Finally, our 
measure of financial performance, ROE, is only significantly and positively correlated with the 
two diversity variables and the two external stakeholder engagement variables. 
Since we know which companies in our sample have assumed formal responsibilities or have 
created specific committees for dealing with CSR issues, we can test if there is a significant 
difference in the mean scores of the stakeholder-related and financial variables of this group of 
companies compared to those that have not assumed such responsibilities. In Table 5 we present 
t-tests of differences in means for firms with and without CSR board responsibilities or 
committees.  
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The 426 firms of our sample that have explicitly assumed board responsibility for CSR issues 
show significantly higher mean scores for engagement with primary and secondary stakeholders: 
customers, employees, external stakeholders (both scope and process). However, differences 
regarding the diversity of nationalities on the board are only marginally significant, whereas 
gender diversity does not show any significant differences. The results for the 192 firms that have 
created a specific CSR board committee are similar: significant differences exist for the variables 
of stakeholder engagement (except for scope of external engagement) but no statistically 
significant differences can be found for board diversity measures. These results partially support 
Hypothesis 1a, as it appears that CSR function at board level is positively associated with 
indicators for dealing with primary and secondary stakeholders but not with indicators for more 
diverse representation on the board. As expected from the observed correlations, the differences 
found in stakeholder engagement measures are less pronounced for companies with formal CSR 
committees than for companies with formal CSR board responsibility. With regard to financial 
performance, we do not find significant differences for ROE between companies with and without 
CSR board responsibilities or committees (Hypothesis 1b), although the mean values for firms 
with formal CSR board responsibilities or committees are higher than the values for firms without. 
In order to look at the differences between the countries in our sample, we plotted the scores 
obtained by each country for CSR responsibility on the board on one axis and the average 
scores  obtained for stakeholder engagement on another (see Figure 1). We can observe that 
countries are not mapped randomly across the two-dimensional space but are displayed along a 
positive slope. With the exception of those countries which are only represented by a small 
number of firms and which can thus be regarded as outliers (Indonesia, Thailand, Ireland, Chile, 
Mexico and Malaysia), countries can be roughly grouped into shareholder-centered and 
stakeholder-centered countries according to the classification of La Porta et al. (1998). At first 
glance, countries with an Anglo-Saxon legal tradition (shareholder-centered) obtain lower scores 
in CSR board responsibility and stakeholder engagement than countries with French, German and 
Scandinavian legal traditions (stakeholder-centered). Thus, it seems that the distinction 
shareholder/stakeholder-centered found in previous studies of corporate governance also holds 
for a stakeholder approach within a CSR strategy. However, it is noteworthy that United 
Kingdom, South Africa and Canada do not fit into this scheme and have high scores in both of 
the analyzed dimensions. 
Finally, in order to test the relative effects of the dimensions of a stakeholder approach to 
corporate governance on firm financial performance, we performed multiple regression analysis. 
The detailed regression results are presented in Table 6. Since we found that it is more relevant 
when companies assume formal CSR board responsibility than when they create formal CSR 
committees, we included the first in the models only as an independent dummy variable. When 
we use the whole sample of all countries (Model 2), only diversity of nationalities on the board 
(0.217, p < 0.01) and employee engagement (0.142, p < 0.01) have a significant and positive 
effect on ROE. Whereas CSR board responsibility, board gender diversity and external 
engagement scope have a positive but not statistically significant impact, customer engagement 
and external engagement processes show negative effects. After splitting the sample into 
shareholder-centered and stakeholder-centered countries according to the classification of La 
Porta et al. (1998), the results change considerably. In shareholder-centered countries none of the 
independent variables are statistically significant (Model 4), which confirms the expectation that 
firms in these countries only focus on investor returns. In contrast, companies in stakeholder-
centered countries are expected to consider the welfare of other stakeholders as well, and indeed  
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we find positive effects of diversity of nationalities on the board (0.235, p < 0.01), board gender 
diversity (0.132, p < 0.05), employee engagement (0.181, p < 0.05) and external engagement 
scope (0.190, p < 0.05) (Model 6). CSR board responsibility increases in its positive impact without 
reaching statistical significance, while customer engagement and external engagement processes 
maintain their negative association with financial performance. 
Table 6  
Regression results for effects of CSR board responsibility, board diversity and stakeholder engagement 
on financial performance (ROE) 






Variables  Model 1
a  Model 2
a  Model 3
 b  Model 4
b  Model 5
b  Model 6
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2  0.117 0.213 0.086 0.234 0.035 0.179 
Adjusted R
2  0.065 0.104 0.051 0.111 -0.018 0.082 
F  2.236*** 1.949*** 2.451*** 1.903***  0.665  1.836*** 
Notes: Standardized regression coefficients are shown; standard errors are in parentheses. 
*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01 
a. Dummy variables were specified to control for market sector and countries. 
b. Dummy variables were specified to control for market sector only. 
 
Therefore, we do not find support for Hypothesis 1b which suggested higher financial performance 
for firms with explicit CSR function at board level. Hypothesis 2, stating that board diversity will 
have a positive effect on firm financial performance, is supported for the whole sample in the case 
of board diversity with regard to nationality, and also in stakeholder-centered countries for women 
represented on the board of directors. Hypotheses 3a, stating that engagement with primary 
stakeholders will have a positive effect on firm financial performance, receives support when 
considering employee engagement but not when considering customer engagement, which in fact  
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seems to lead to decreased ROE. Hypotheses 3b, stating that engagement with secondary 
stakeholders will have a positive effect on firm financial performance, is only supported in 
stakeholder-centered countries with respect to the scope of the engagement; the chosen engagement 
process seems to be counterproductive for financial improvement. 
Figure 1  
CSR board responsibility and stakeholder engagement by countries 
 
Discussion 
In this paper, we have argued for the relevance of three dimensions when analyzing a pro-
stakeholder stance to corporate governance: CSR function at board level, board diversity and 
stakeholder engagement. The results of this study confirm that dealing with CSR issues on the 
board is positively associated with engagement with customers, employees and external 
stakeholders (local communities, NGOs, government, etc.). This shows that firms that explicitly 
take the interests of multiple stakeholders into account in their board decisions also make the 
effort to engage with important primary and secondary stakeholders to understand their needs 
and concerns. Since the comparison of means delivered better results for companies with CSR 
board responsibility than for companies with CSR committees, it appears to be more effective to 
assume the CSR commitment as a board responsibility than to create a formal committee.  
16 - IESE Business School-University of Navarra 
We found that CSR board responsibility and stakeholder engagement are more common in 
countries with stakeholder-centered models of corporate governance than in countries with 
shareholder-centered modes of governance. Therefore, it seems that the different national legal 
traditions affect not only types of finance, ownership and labor relations but also the 
consideration of non-shareholder-stakeholder interests from a CSR and sustainability perspective. 
However, the fact that the United Kingdom and South Africa do not fit into this scheme may also 
indicate that corporate strategy concerning CSR is favored by the specific institutional structures 
and political legacies of Europe in comparison with other world regions (Doh and Guay, 2006; 
Welford, 2005). 
Our results did not support the hypothesized link between CSR function at board level and board 
diversity. Due to the available data, board diversity was measured through nationality and gender 
diversity on the board. Although recent research has assumed that the inclusion of more women 
and minorities on boards will increase board legitimacy and alter the way the board operates to 
include more explicit recognition of stakeholder issues (e.g. Hillman et al., 2002), the mere 
presence of these representatives probably cannot be interpreted as an indicator that corporations 
are sensitive to issues of boardroom diversity. As highlighted by Zelechowski and Bilimoria 
(2004), to establish whether women or minority directors are contributing to board diversity, we 
should measure to what extent their characteristics and qualifications differ from white male 
officers (background, knowledge, maturity, experience, perspective and prestige). 
Following the arguments of instrumental stakeholder theory, we expected to find a positive impact 
of the different stakeholder-related practices on firm performance measured as ROE. Our regression 
results indicate that the relationship between stakeholder practices and firm profitability depends on 
the legal tradition of the country where the company is based. Although previous evidence for the 
positive effect of board diversity and stakeholder engagement on firm financial performance has 
been reported for US firms, we only found some support for our theoretical predictions in countries 
with a corporate governance model oriented towards stakeholders (countries with non-Anglo-Saxon 
legal tradition). In these countries, more diverse board representation of nationalities and gender, 
higher engagement with employees and broader scope of engagement with external stakeholders 
appeared to pay off in terms of increased profitability. Surprisingly, however, a similarly positive 
relationship could not be observed for the intensity of customer engagement and external 
engagement processes. An explanation could be the framing of the related questions in SAM 
Group’s questionnaire, which are based on qualitative information. As an indicator for the customer 
engagement we used a question that lists different ways the company integrates customer feedback 
with varying degrees of commitment towards the customer (ombudsman, database, helpdesk, web, 
etc.). For measuring the external engagement process we used a question about the mechanisms put 
in place by the company for engaging with external stakeholders that reflects very different 
engagement mechanisms (stakeholder identification, regular meetings, feedback incorporation and 
long-term partnerships). In comparison to the other variables for stakeholder relations, which are 
based on more quantitative information, such as percentages, the variables of customer engagement 
and external engagement processes are less objective, and thus may have an effect on our 
regression results. Finally, explicit board responsibility for CSR also failed to exhibit a statistically 
significant impact on financial performance, which indicates that the inclusion of sustainability 
issues in board decision-making does not make a difference in profitability terms.  
However, our findings should be interpreted with caution since additional analyses using 
alternative measures of financial performance, such as Tobin’s Q and Market Value-Added, are  
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not significant. Since previous studies have shown that accounting-based measures are better 
predictors of corporate social responsibility than market-based measures (Wu, 2006), further 
research should explore the suitability of different measures of financial performance. For the 
time being, research on the relationship between corporate social performance and corporate 
financial performance is still inconclusive, with some researchers finding a positive linkage, 
others finding a negative linkage and a third group finding no significant linkage (see Margolish 
and Walsh (2003) and Orlitzky et al. (2003) for two recent reviews of the impact of CSR on 
economic performance). 
Like all research, our study has some limitations that need to be addressed. Although the SAM 
Group database probably represents the best externally-based assessment currently available of 
large corporations worldwide in sustainability issues, it has some weaknesses. In order to allow 
comparison among all questions of the questionnaire, SAM applies a normalized scoring system 
based on its own judgment and interpretation. This scale, ranging between 0 and 100, although 
not publicly available, is surely debatable, above all if it is applied to qualitative information like 
mechanisms for integrating customer feedback or for engaging with external stakeholders. 
Another limitation of the study is the fact that some countries have more firms in the sample than 
others. Although the large sample and the geographical dispersion of the firms included in the 
analysis increases the external validity of our results, the sample size was very different for each 
country. There were countries, such as Mexico or Ireland, with 3 or fewer observations in our 
sample alongside 325 US firms, 126 Japanese firms, 101 UK firms and 64 Australian firms. 
Finally, the generalizability of our findings is somewhat limited, since our sample consisted of 
the largest publicly-held companies worldwide with a relatively high level of awareness in CSR 
issues. 
Conclusions 
Although theoretical connections have been made between corporate governance theories and 
stakeholder theory, and between stakeholder theory and corporate social responsibility (CSR), 
little research has been conducted on the intersection of corporate governance and CSR or 
corporate sustainability. CSR suggests that companies have responsibilities that go beyond the 
interests of their shareholders and must include those of other stakeholders (employees, 
customers, suppliers, environmentalists, communities, etc.) and the broader society in which they 
operate. In this sense, the present paper frames the discussion on a stakeholder model of corporate 
governance within the perspective of the sustainable and responsible firm whose economic 
survival depends on its ability to satisfy the needs of its various stakeholders.  
In an attempt to move forward in firm-level characterization of the stakeholder approach to 
corporate governance, we have argued for the relevance of three dimensions: CSR function at 
board level, board diversity and stakeholder engagement. In our study we found evidence that 
CSR responsibility on the board is positively associated with indicators for dealing with primary 
and secondary stakeholders but not with indicators of more diverse representation on the board. 
However, even if board diversity does not seem to be an indicator of the stakeholder approach to 
corporate governance, it appears to have a positive impact on firm profitability, just as 
stakeholder engagement with employees and external stakeholders does. Improving on previous 
empirical research which focused only on US firms, the present study explores the effects of 
board diversity and stakeholder engagement on firm financial performance by using an  
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international sample from 31 different countries and finds that the national context determines 
the importance of these variables. 
Future research should investigate further the influence of country and industry on the adoption 
of a stakeholder approach to corporate governance. As more data becomes available it would also 
be useful to determine whether or not the relationships that we have examined hold consistently 
over time. In order to obtain a broader picture of the benefits of a stakeholding approach, future 
studies should consider non-financial firm-level performance indicators and analyze the impact 
of stakeholder practices on these kinds of measures.  
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